JUDGMENTS OF OTHER STATES.

weighs everything in the balances of worldly policy, and ends most
generally, in the practical adoption of the vile maxim, 'that the
end sanctifies the means.' If it be true, as he has said, who, more
than any mere man, before or since his day, understood the depths
of human character, that one even may,
'By telling of it,
Make such a sinner of his memory;
To credit is own lie:'-

be careful never to speak or act, without regard to the morale of
your words or actions. The habit may and-will grow to be a second
nature.
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"There is no class of men among whom moral delinquency is
more marked and disgraceful than among lawyers. Among merchants, so many honest men become involved through misfortune,
that the rogue may hope to take shelter in the crowd, and be
screened from observation. Not so the lawyer. If he continues
to seek business, he must find his employment in lower and still
lower grades; and will soon come to verify and illustrate the remark
of Lord Bolingbroke, that 'the profession of the law, in its nature
the noblest and most beneficial to mankind, is in its abuse and
abasement, the most sordid and pernicious.' "

JUDGMENTS OF OTHER STATES.
The following notice of some recent cases is offered as a supplement to Judge Hare's valuable note to HMills vs. Duryee and
Mc-lmoyle vs. Cohen, in the second volume of the American Leadin Cases, p. 774.
The difficulty anticipated by Mr. Justice Johnson, in his dissenting opinion, in the case of Hills vs. Duryee, 7 Cranch, 481, has
lately been presented to the Supreme Court of the United States,
and received a solution in accordance with his views. In D'Arey vs. Xetchum, 11 Howard, U. S. R., 165 (decided in
1850), it was held that a judgment against joint debtors, rendered
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in the State, of New York, upon service of process on one only of the
joint debtors, was of no effect, in the State of Louisiana, against the
debtor not served, although the statute of New York provided that
in New York it should bind the joint property of the defendants,
and be primafacie evidence of the indebtedness of the defendants
not served. The court admit that such was the effect of the record
in New York, but they deny that the Constitution and the Act of
Congress, of May 2, 1790, as construed in the case of Mis vs.
1ur~yee, extended to such a judgment as the international law at
that time refused to recognize; (as, for example, a judgment without service of process or appearance) or declared a new rule, enabling one state to enact laws for other states, by giving a new effect
to such judgments.
Yet it is to be remembered, that in AElmoyle vs. Cohens, 13
Peters, 312, it had been settled that a state might, by statute,
regulate and abridge the limitation of time for bringing suit upon
a judgment of another state, and in every way completely control

thle remedy.
The interpretation. which Mr, Justice Johnson feared might be
deduced from the judgment in Mi7le vs. Durye, has been contended
for in most of the states, though generally without success. Indeed,
in some 6ases, it would seem to have beenw supposed that a judgment was made, by the Act of Congress, of greaterforce in other
states than in the state where it was rendered, notwithstanding theexpress declaration of the Supreme Court, in MeJlmoyle vs. Cohen,
13 Peters, 812, that such judgments "are conclusive upon the defor sw causes as would be suffil.et
fendant in every state, ezeeptJ
to set ad& the judgmeft in the cours of the seate in w dc it was
rendered."

The .Supreme Court of New York, as early as 18i8, gave the
proper construction to the decision in Migl vs. Duryee, in Bordm
vs. Fitch, 15 J. B 143, in which it was held that a, record of a
decree of divorce, obtained in Vermont, might be avoided by proof
that the court had no jurisdiction of the person of the defendant;
and might also be impeached as obtained by fraud, because that
would impeach the judgment in Vermont (citing Permor'8 case, 3
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Rep., 77). The elaborate opinion of Thompson, J., in this case,
will be found to have anticipated the decision in D'Arcy vs.
fKetchum. Story Confl. Laws, § 609, also instances fraud as a
defence, not excluded by the Constitution and Act of Congress.,
An interesting case has been determined in Connecticut (Pearce
vs. Olney, 20 Conn. R. 544), which arose upon a bill in equity,
filed by Pearce to restrain Olney from suing upon a judgment obtained in the Superior Court of the City of New York, upon personal service of process upon Pearce, but which he was induced not
to defend, upon the misrepresentation of Olney, that the suit was
commenced by mistake against him instead of against his principal
(the real person liable), and should be discontinued.
It was earnestly contended that no relief could be given in Connecticut against the New York judgment without a violation of the
constitution and the Act of Congress; but the Supreme Court of
Errors of Connecticut held, that it could give the same relief that
a Court of Equity could give in New York against the judgment
as obtained by fraud and imposition ; and decreed that the judgment was so obtained and perpetually enjoined any action upon it.
The New York judgment was afterwards sued in New York, and
the case is reported as Dobson vs. Pearce, 1 Duer Superior Court
Reports, p. 143. The defendant, (under the New York Code,
allowing equitable as well as legal claims and defences in the same
action,) pleaded the Connecticut decree in bar. And the court
held it was a bar as proving that the judgment had been fraudulently recovered without further evidence. Mr. Justice Paine, one
of the judges, dissented on the grounds that the Conngcticut decree
ought to be construed only as enjoining suit in Connecticut; also
that the defence ought to have been made by a cross suit to avoid
the judgment; and lastly, on the notion that the constitution and
Act of Cdngress had been disregarded by the Connecticut Court,
his opinion being founded on the assumption that the Act of Congress gave a force to the judgment in Connecticut, which it had not
in New York, or rather that all remedy was confined to the court
of the State where the judgment was rendered, which amounts

